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ABSTRACT 
MANETS suffer from constraints in power, storage and computational resources ,as a result, they  are more 
vulnerable to various communications security related attacks. therefore we attempt to focus on analyzing and 
improving  the  security  of  routing  protocol  for  MANETS  viz.  the  Ad  hoc  On  Demand  Distance  Vector 
(AODV)routing protocol. We propose modifications to the AODV we propose an algorithm to counter the 
Black hole attack on the routing protocols in MANETs. All the routes has unique sequence number and the 
malicious  node  has  the  highest  Destination  Sequence  number  and  it  is  the  first  RREP  to  arrive.  So  the 
comparison is made only to the first entry in the table without checking other entries in the table  
Keywords - AODV,   Black hole, receive reply, sequence number, routing table 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Routing in ad hoc networks faces a number of 
challenges  like  dynamic  topology,  node  mobility, 
lack  of  infrastructure,  low  battery  life,  insecure 
medium  and  limited  channel  capacity,  causing  a 
significant  degradation  of  routing  performance.  A 
number  of  surveys  cover  the  security  issues  and 
intrusion  detection  schemes  in  MANETs  [1].  All 
nodes  keep  updating  their  routing  tables  based  on 
information  broadcast  by  other  nodes.  Therefore, 
routing table overflow attacks are possible that can 
disrupt  the  routing  process.  Reactive  protocols  are 
more  robust  against  replay  attacks  because  of  the 
nature  of  routing  messages  involved,  such  as  with 
AODV  [2].  We  propose  an  algorithm  to  counter 
Black  hole  attack  against  the  AODV  routing 
protocol. By analysis we observe that by adding timer 
component time is saved and if destination sequence 
number  greater  than  source  ie  value  greater  than 
threshold the malicious node is identified at the initial 
stage  itself  and  immediately  removed  so  that  it 
cannot take part in further process. 
 
II.  AODV 
Routing information is collected only when it is 
needed, and route determination depends on sending 
route  queries  throughout  the  network.  The  primary 
advantage  of  reactive  routing  is  that  the  wireless 
channel is not subject to the routing overhead data for 
routes that may never be used. 
While reactive protocols do not have the fixed 
overhead required by maintaining continuous routing 
tables, they  may  have considerable route discovery 
delay, can also add a significant amount of control 
traffic to the network due to query flooding. 
 
2.1 AODV Routing Protocol. 
This protocol is composed of two mechanism (1) 
Route Discovery and (2) Route Maintenance. AODV 
uses  Route  Re  Request  (RREQ),  Route  Reply 
(RREP) control messages in Route Discovery phase 
and Route Error (RERR) control message in Route 
Maintenance phase .The header information of  this 
control messages can be seen in detail in. In general, 
the nodes participating in the communication can be 
classified as source node, an intermediate node or a 
destination node. With each role, the behavior of a 
node actually varies [3]. When a source node wants 
to connect to a destination node, first it checks in the 
existing route table, as to whether a fresh route to that 
destination is available or not. If a fresh enough route 
is  available,  it  uses  the  same.  Otherwise  the  node 
initiates a Route Discovery by broadcasting a RREQ 
control message to all of its neighbors. This RREQ 
message  will  further  be  forwarded  (again 
broadcasted)  by  the  intermediate  nodes  to  their 
neighbors  [4].  This  process  will  continue  until  the 
destination  node  or  an  intermediate  node  having  a 
fresh  route  to  the  destination.  At  this  stage 
eventually,  a  RREP  control  message  is  generated. 
Thus, a source node after sending a RREQ waits for 
RREPs to be received. 
 
Fig 2.1: Classification of AODV routing protocol 
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2.2 Working of AODV 
The  RREQ  contains  the  node’s  IP  address, 
current  sequence  number,  broadcast  ID  and  most 
recent sequence number for the destination known to 
the source node. The destination node, on receipt of 
RREQ, ends a route reply (RREP) packet along the 
reverse path established at intermediate nodes during 
the route discovery process. In case of a link failure 
route error (RERR) packet is sent to the source and 
destination nodes. By the use of sequence numbers, a 
source node   is always able to find new valid routes. 
AODV defines  three types of control  messages for 
route maintenance [5]. 
 
2.3. Security Flaws in AODV 
AODV  is  vulnerable  to  routing  attacks  by 
malicious nodes due to possible applications of the 
paper.  Although a conclusion may review the main 
points of the paper, do not replicate the abstract as the 
conclusion.  A  conclusion  might  elaborate  on  the 
importance of the work or suggest applications and 
extensions generally designed to have features such 
as authentication, integrity, confidentiality and non-
repudiation. AODV can easily be manipulated by a 
malicious node to disrupt its routing.  
 
The following actions can be taken by an inside 
attacker to disrupt routing in AODV: 
1)   Modify/forge RREQ or RREP packets. 
2)   Spoof   destination or source IP address to pose 
as legitimate network node and thus receive or 
drop data packets. 
3)   Generate      fake  RERR  packets  to  increase 
routing delay and degrade network performance 
[6]. 
4)   Cause DoS by  sending fake RREPs of  highest 
sequence numbers (like Black hole attack)[7]. 
5)   Create  routing  loops  and  launch  sleep 
deprivation  or  resource  consumption  attacks  to 
deplete node batteries. 
6)  Replay  old  routing  messages  or  make  a 
tunnel/wormhole. 
 
Advantages and disadvantages   
The  main  advantage  of  this  protocol  is  having 
routes  established  on  demand  and  that  destination 
sequence numbers are applied to find the latest route 
to the destination [8]. The connection setup delay is 
lower.  One  disadvantage  of  this  protocol  is  that 
intermediate nodes can lead to inconsistent routes if 
the  source  sequence  number  is  very  old  and  the 
intermediate nodes have a higher but not the latest 
destination  sequence  number,  thereby  having  stale 
entries  [9].  Also,  multiple  route  Reply  packets  in 
response to a single Route Request packet can lead to 
heavy control overhead and unnecessary bandwidth 
consumption  due  to  periodic  beaconing  multiple 
Route  Reply packets in response to a single Route 
Request packet can lead to heavy control overhead 
and  unnecessary  bandwidth  consumption  due  to 
periodic beaconing 
 
III. BLACK HOLE ATTACK 
Routing  protocols  are  exposed  to  a  variety  of 
attacks .Black hole attack is one such attack and a 
kind of Denial Of Service (DoS) in which a malicious 
node  makes  use  of  the  vulnerabilities  of  the  route 
discovery packets of the routing protocol to Advertise 
itself as having the shortest path to the node whose 
packets  it  wants  to  intercept.  This  attack  aims  at 
modifying the routing protocol so that traffic flows 
through  a  specific  node  controlled  by  the  attacker 
.During the Route Discovery process, the source node 
sends  RREQ  packets  to  the  intermediate  nodes  to 
find fresh path to the intended destination. Malicious 
nodes  respond  immediately  to  the  source  node  as 
these nodes do not refer the routing table [10]. The 
node S is assumed to be the source node desiring to 
communicate  with  node  D.  Thus,  as  per  the 
explanation earlier, node S would generate the RREQ 
control  message  and  broadcast  it.  The  broadcasted 
RREQ control message is expected to be received by 
the nodes N1, N2 and N3. Assuming that the node 
N2 has a route to node D in its route table, the node 
N2  would  generate  a  RREP  control  message  and 
update  its  routing  table  with  the  accumulated  hop 
count  and  the  destination  sequence  number  of  the 
destination  node.  The  larger  the  sequence  number, 
the fresher is the route. Node N2 will now send it to 
node S (Destination Sequence Number is shown in 
square bracket in (Figure 2.3.1). Since node N1 and 
node N3 do not have a route to node D, they would 
again broadcast the RREQ control message .RREQ 
control  message  broadcasted  by  node  N3  is  also 
expected to be received by node M (assumed to be a 
malicious node). Thus, node M being malicious node, 
would  generate  a  false  RREP  control  message  and 
send  it  to  node  N3  with  a  very  high  destination 
sequence number, that subsequently would be sent to 
the node S. However, since, the destination sequence 
number  is  high,  the  route  from  node  N3  will  be 
considered to be fresher and hence node S would start 
sending  data  packets  to  node  N3.Node  N3  would 
send  the  same  to  the  malicious  node.  The  RREQ 
control  message  from  node  N1,  would  eventually 
reach  node  D  (destination  node),  which  would 
generate RREP control message and route it back. 
 D Roy Choudhury et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications             www.ijera.com 
ISSN : 2248-9622, Vol. 4, Issue 8( Version 3), August 2014, pp.190-195 
  www.ijera.com                                                                                                                              192 | P a g e  
 
Fig 3: Traversal of Control Messages in AODV 
 
However, since the node S has a RREP control 
message with higher destination sequence number to 
that  route,  node  S  will  ignore  two  genuine  RREP 
control  messages.  The  source  node  processed  the 
incoming RREPs for consideration is shown .After a 
source  node  receives  a  RREP  message,  it  calls 
Receive Reply (Packet P) method one of the crucial 
function of AODV [11]. 
 
3.1. Black hole attack caused by RREQ 
 
Fig 3.1: An attacker can send fake RREQ 
messages to form black hole attack 
   
The  attacker  can  generate  Black  hole  attack  by 
faked RREQ message as follows:  
In   RREQ   Black hole attack, the attacker. Set 
the  type  field  to  RREQ  (1)  Set  the  originator  IP 
address to the originating node's IP address; Set the 
destination  IP  address  to  the  destination  node's  IP 
address; Set the source IP address (in the IP header) 
to anon-existent IP address (Black hole); Increase the 
source sequence number by at least one, or decrease 
the hop count to 1.The attacker forms a Black hole 
attack between the source node and the destination 
node by faked RREQ message. 
 
3.2 Black hole attack caused by RREP 
The attacker may generate a RREP message to 
form  Black  hole  as  follows:    Set  the  type  field  to 
RREP  (2);  Set  the  hop  count  field  to  1;Set  the 
originator IP address as the originating node of the 
route and the destination IP address as the destination 
node of the route, Increase the destination sequence 
number by at least one; Set the source IP address (in 
the  IP  header)  to  a  nonexistent  IP  address  (Black 
hole).The  attacker  unicasts  the  faked  RREP[12] 
message  to  the  originating  node.  When  originating 
node receives the faked RREP message, it will update 
its route to destination node through the non-existent 
node. Then RREP Black hole is formed  
 
 
Fig 3.2: Black Hole is formed by fake RREP 
 
IV. GENERAL PROPOSED 
ALGORITHM 
The  solution  that  we  propose  here  is  basically 
only modifies the working of the source node without 
altering intermediate and destination nodes by using a 
method called Prior_Receive Reply. In this method 
three  things  are  added,  a  new  table  RR-Table 
(Request Reply), a timer WT (Waiting Time) and a 
variable  MN-ID  (Malicious  Node  ID)  to  the  data 
structures in the default AODV Protocol. 
  
4.1 Algorithm: Prior-Receive Reply Method  
DSN  –  Destination  Sequence  Number,  NID  – 
Node ID, MN-ID – Malicious Node ID(M node). 
Step 1: (Initialization Process) Retrieve the current 
time and add the current time with waiting time. 
 
Step  2:  (Storing  Process)  Store    all  the  Route 
Replies DSN and NID in RR-Table(R) table. Repeat 
the above process until the time exceeds.  
 
Step  3:  (Identify  and  Remove  Malicious  Node) 
Retrieve   the first entry from RR-Table, If DSN is 
much greater than SSN then discard entry from RR-
Table and store its NID in MN-ID.  
 
Step 4: (Node Selection Process) Sort the contents 
of RR-Table   entries   according to the DSN Select 
the  NID  having  highest  DSN  among  RR-table 
entries.  
 
Step  5:  (Continue  default  process)  Call  Receive 
Reply method of default AODV Protocol. The above 
algorithm starts from the initialization process, first 
set the waiting time for the source node to receive the 
RREQ  coming  from  other  nodes  and  then  add  the 
current time with the waiting time. Then in storing 
process,  store  all  the  RREQ  Destination  Sequence 
Number (DSN) and its Node Id in RR-Table until the 
computed  time  exceeds.  Generally  the  first  route 
reply  will  be  from  the  malicious  node  with  high 
destination sequence number, which is stored as the 
first entry in the RR-Table. Then compare the first 
destination  sequence  number  with  the  source  node 
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differences  between  them,  surely  that  node  is  the 
malicious node, immediately remove that entry from 
the  RR-Table.  This  is  how  malicious  node  is 
identified and removed. Final process is selecting the 
next node id that has the higher destination sequence 
number,  is  obtained  by  sorting  the  RR-Table 
according to the DSEQ-NO column, whose packet is 
sent to Receive Reply method in order to continue the 
default operations of AODV protocol. In addition, the 
proposed  solution  maintains  the  identity  of  the 
malicious  node  as  MN-Id,  so  that  in  future,  it  can 
discard any control messages coming from that node. 
Now since malicious node is identified, the routing 
table for that node is not maintained. In addition, the 
control messages from the malicious node, too, are 
not forwarded in the network. Moreover, in order to 
maintain  freshness  the  RR-Table  is  flushed  once  a 
route  request  is  chosen  from  it[13].  Thus,  the 
operation of the proposed protocol is the same as that 
of the original AODV, once the malicious node has 
been detected. 
 
4.2 Main benefits of modifying AODV protocol   
(1)  The  malicious  node  is  identified  at  the  initial 
stage itself and immediately removed so that it 
cannot take part in further process [14].  
 (2)  With  no  delay  the  malicious  node  are  easily 
identified i.e. as we said before all the routes has 
unique sequence number. 
Generally  the  malicious  node  has  the  highest 
Destination Sequence number and it is the first RREP 
to arrive. So the comparison is made only to the first 
entry in the table without checking other entries in 
the table. 
(3)  No  modification  is  made  in  other  default 
operations of AODV Protocol. 
 (4)  Better  performance  produced  in  little 
modification.  
(5)  Less memory overhead occurs because only few 
new things are added. 
For every RREP control  message received, the 
source node would first check whether it has an entry 
for the destination in the route table or not. If it finds 
one,  the  source  node  would  check  whether  the 
destination sequence number in the incoming control 
message is higher than one it sent last in the RREQ or 
not. If the destination sequence number is higher, the 
source node will update its routing table with the new 
RREP control message; otherwise the RREP control 
message  will  be  discarded  [15].  In  Route 
Maintenance phase, if a node finds a link break or 
failure, then it sends RERR message to all the nodes 
that uses the route. 
 
V.  Recv Reply algorithm At Source 
Node: AODV 
Receive Reply (Packet P) 
{    if(P has an entry in Route Table) 
{ select Dest_Seq_No from routing table 
  If (P.Dest_Seq_No>Dest_Seq_No) 
{  update entry of P in routing table, unicast data 
 packets to the route specified in RREP   } 
 else   { discard RREP } } 
 else {  if(P.Dest_Seq_No>= Src_Seq_No) 
{   Make entry of P in routing table }  
else { discard this RREP } 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.3(a):flow-chart for node receiving RREP 
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Fig 4.3(b): Basic Flow-chart for node broadcasting 
RREQ 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As compared to the other approaches, we believe 
the  proposed  algorithm  is  simple  and  efficient  and 
has very less delay and congestion in implementation 
.We also emphasize that the proposed algorithm will 
be implemented and simulated for the AODV routing 
algorithm . 
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